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DISCHARGE OF STUDENT LOAN DEBT UNDER 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(A) (8): REASSESSING "UNDUE HARDSHIP" AFTER THE
ELIMINATION OF THE SEVEN-YEAR EXCEPTION
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1998, Congress closed one of only two doors available to debtors seeking discharge of student loan debts in bankruptcy.' Prior to
October 7, 1998, the Bankruptcy Code made student loan debts nondischargeable unless: (1) the loans first became due more than seven
years before the debtor filed for bankruptcy;2 or (2) not allowing the
student loan debts to be discharged would impose an undue hardship
on the debtor and the debtor's dependents.3 On October 7, President
Clinton signed into law the Higher Education Amendments of 1998,
which eliminated the seven-year exception, leaving only the undue
4
hardship exception to non-dischargeability.
This Note argues that "undue hardship" must be interpreted more
broadly than it has been before, now that debtors are no longer protected by the automatic seven-year exception.5 Lowering the standards
necessary to establish "undue hardship" is consistent with the Bankruptcy Code's underlying policy of providing debtors with a fresh start,
free from oppressive debt.6
1. See Craig A. Gargotta, Congress Amends § 523(a)(8) to Eliminate Seven-Year Discharge Provisionfor Student Loans, 17-NOV AM. BANKR. INST. J. 8, 8 (1998).
2. See Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 3621(1), 104 Stat. 4789,
4964 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (8) (A)) (repealed 1998). Section
523(a) (8) (A) originally required that an education loan be due for a five year period.
See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2549, 2591.
3. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2591
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B) (1994)).
4. See Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, § 971, 112
Stat. 1581, 1837 (1998) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a) (8) (1999)). The
primary purpose of the 1998 Higher Education Amendments was to provide federal
funding for student loans at a reduced interest rate. See Gargotta, supra note 1, at 8.
5. For an article making the opposite argument, see Gargotta, supra note 1. To
Gargotta, the elimination of the seven-year exception suggests that Congress now views
'undue hardship" as creditor protection rather than debtor protection. See id. at 9.
According to that view, "the circumstances that warrant an undue hardship discharge
may have to be more extreme than previously considered." Id.
6. See Robert F. Salvin, Student Loans, Bankruptcy, and the Fresh Start Policy: Must
DebtorsBe Impoverished to DischargeEducationalLoansi, 71 TUL.L. REv. 139 (1996) (arguing prior to the 1998 elimination of the seven-year discharge that undue hardship
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Part II presents § 523 (a) (8) of the Bankruptcy Code and discusses
its legislative history. 7 Part III discusses the major tests used by courts
to determine whether "undue hardship" has been established.8 Part IV
explains the critical role the seven-year discharge once played in guiding judicial interpretation of "undue hardship" and how the repeal of
the seven-year discharge requires that standard to be reassessed.9 This
note concludes that the often harsh previous interpretations of "undue
hardship" were the natural result of a statutory scheme that provided
for automatic discharge after seven-years, and that the courts must
lower that standard now because debtors no longer have any other way
out of oppressive student loan debt.
II.

SECTION 523(A) (8)

Section 523(a) (8) of the Bankruptcy Code currently provides:
A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or
1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual
debtor from any debt-for an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, insured or guaranteed by a governmental unit or nonprofit institution, or for an
obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship or stipend, unless excepting such debt
from discharge under this paragraph will impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor's
dependents.' 0
should be interpreted more leniently, in a manner more consistent with the fresh start
policy).
7. See infra notes 10-26.
8. See infra notes 27-107.
9. See infra notes 108-51.
10. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (8) (1999). At the conclusion of a bankruptcy case the

debtor is normally granted a discharge, an injunction against the enforcement by creditors of the debtor's pre-filing obligations. See 11 U.S.c. §§ 524, 727 (1994). In a Chapter Seven case, an individual debtor is granted a discharge in exchange for having

surrendered his or her non-exempt property to the bankruptcy trustee, who liquidates
that property and distributes the proceeds to the creditors. In a Chapter 13 case, indi-

vidual debtors may keep all or most of their property, provided the court approves a
repayment plan in accordance with the Code. See id. at §§ 1321-28. Chapter Nine for

municipal bankruptcy, Chapter 11 for corporate reorganization (or sometimes individual reorganization), and Chapter 12 for family-farmer bankruptcy, work in much the

same fashion. See id. at §§ 941-44, 1121-41, 1321-28. In certain cases it is possible for a
debtor to be denied a discharge, such as where the debtor attempts to hide or conceal
its assets from creditors. See id. at § 727(a).
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Before 1990, notwithstanding a debtor's discharge in bankruptcy,
§ 523 (a) (8) specifically restricts the dischargeability of student loans
that were insured or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or that were
made under any program funded by a governmental unit or nonprofit
institution." An amendment to § 523(a) (8) in 1990 added the words
"or for an obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit,
scholarship or stipend."' 2 "The added words [have] removed any requirement that the loan involve a governmental.. .or nonprofit institution."' 3 Thus, "§ 523(a) (8) [now may] be interpreted as applying to a
4
loan made by any lender for an educational purpose."'
Supporters of § 523(a) (8) argue that educational loans are not
granted on the same basis as other loans. 15 Lenders or guarantors who
participate in educational loan programs typically extend credit to stu6
dents who might not qualify for credit under traditional standards.'
Interest rates and repayment terms can be very favorable to the student
borrower, and no security is usually required.' 7 Such lending fosters
the government's policy of promoting access to educational
8
opportunities.'
In enacting § 523 (a) (8), Congress was primarily concerned about
abusive student debtors and protecting the solvency of student loan
programs.' 9 In particular, Congress was concerned by reports of irresponsible students and recent graduates declaring bankruptcy as a way
20
to avoid repayment of student loans on the eve of lucrative careers.
Upon graduation, the typical student has little or no non-exempt property that can be distributed to creditors, but may have substantial future earning potential. 2 1 Section 523 (a) (8) was designed to remove
the perceived temptation of recent graduates to use the bankruptcy
system as a low cost method of unencumbering those future
22
earnings.
11.
12.

See 2 COLLIER BANKRUPTcY MANuAL 523.13[1] (3d ed. 1999).
ROBERT L. JORDAN Er AL., BANKRuPTcy 186 (5th ed. 1999).

13.

Id. at 186-87.

14.

Id. at 187.

15.

See id. at 186.

16.

See 2 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY MANuAL,supra note 11, at 523.13[1].
See joRDAN,supra note 12, at 186.
See Santa Fe Med. Servs., Inc. v. Segal (In re Segal), 57 F.3d 342, 348 (3d Cir.

17.

18.
1995).
19. See Andresen v. Nebraska Student Loan Program (In re Andresen), Inc., 232
B.R. 127, 137 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1999).
20. See Thad Collins, ForgingMiddle Ground: Revision of Student Loan Debts in Bankruptcy as an Impetus to Amend 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8), 75 IOWA L. REv. 733, 741-42 (1990).
21. SeeJoRDAN, supra note 12, at 186.
22. See id.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

Those who opposed the enactment of § 523 (a) (8) addressed the
lack of empirical evidence supporting the theory that students and
graduates were trying to take advantage of the bankruptcy system, or
that such bad actors actually posed a threat to the continued viability
of student loan programs. 23 A study by the General Accounting Office
made before the enactment of § 523 (a) (8) found that only a fraction
of one percent of matured student loans had been discharged in bankruptcy, a rate that compared favorably to the consumer credit industry
overall. 2 4 The study also found that most debtors who had obtained
discharge of student loans in bankruptcy also had other significant indebtedness, leading to the conclusion that those filings represented a
genuine need for bankruptcy relief rather than attempts to find an
easy avenue to student debt relief.2 5

Finally, the opposition to

§ 523 (a) (8) also argued that the non-dischargeability of student loans
was merely a collection device "for lenders26who were not being aggressive enough with their collection efforts."
III.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF "UNDUE HARDSHIP"

Despite all the debate, "undue hardship" remains undefined in
the Bankruptcy Code. 2 7 Additionally, the scope of the legislative history to § 523(a) (8) is limited to Congress's purpose in excepting student loans from discharge. 28 The legislative history only indicates that
Congress intended to preserve student loan programs and to bar undeserving student borrowers from abusing the bankruptcy system. 2 9 The
legislative history does little to assist a court in identifying when Con30
gress intended student loans to be discharged for "undue hardship."
To fill in the gap left by Congress, courts have developed a number of tests for determining the existence of "undue hardship" over the
last two decades. 3 1 Although the courts have tried to accurately reflect
and enforce Congress's intent in providing an "undue hardship" exception to non-dischargeability, the tests each contain important dif23.
24.

See Andresen, 232 B.R. at 137.
See H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 133 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.G.A.N. 5963,

6094. The House report contains the results of the General Accounting Office study,

along with the opposing arguments made with respect to nondiscbargeability.
25. See id.
26. See Andresen, 232 B.R. at 137.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 130.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See i& at 137.
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as many tests for
ferences. 32 Thus, it has been noted that "there are
33
courts."
bankruptcy
are
there
as
hardship
undue
A.

The Brunner Test

The test that has emerged as the majority view, having been
34
adopted by most bankruptcy courts and several circuit courts, was set
forth by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Brunner v. New York
State HigherEducationServices Corp.35 Under the Brunnertest, the court
considers three factors: (1) whether the debtor "cannot maintain,
based on current income and expenses, a 'minimal' standard of living
for herself and her dependents if forced to repay the loans;"3 6 (2)
whether additional circumstances exist indicating that the debtor's
state of affairs is "likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period;" 37 and (3) whether the debtor has made "good faith ef38
forts" to repay the loans.
The purpose of the good faith inquiry is to ensure that the
debtor's inability to repay student loans should not have been caused
by the debtor's own willfulness or negligence, but rather by circumstances beyond the debtor's control. 39 Therefore, the good faith
prong of the Brunner test is met as long as the debtor, through no fault
40
of his or her own, has never had the ability to repay student loans.
Application of the Brunner test necessarily requires each court to apply
its own intuitive sense of what constitutes a "minimal" standard of liv4
ing and "good faith.", '
Typical of cases applying the Brunner test is In re Roberson.4 2 After
graduating from high school and serving in the United States Army for
three years as an equipment repairman and operator the debtor, Jerry
32.

See id.

33. See Salvin, supra note 6, at 149. However, Salvin observes that "[e]ven courts
purporting to use the same test will differ in the subtleties with which the test is applied." See id. at n.64.
34. See Gargotta, supra note 1, at 8.
35. 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987).
36. Id. at 396.

37.

Id.

38. Id.
39. See Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d
298, 305 (3d Cir. 1995).
40. See 2 COLUIER BANKRuPTcy MANUAL, supra note 11, at 523.12[2].
41. See id.
42. 999 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1993).
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Roberson, opted for a career change. 43 Roberson first received an associate of science degree in industry and technology at a community
college and later earned a bachelor of science degree in industrial
technology from Northern Illinois University.4 4 Roberson financed his
education with $9,702 in student loans4 5that were guaranteed by the
Illinois Student Assistance Commission.
Roberson earned $33,000 in 1988 and another $30,000 in 1989
working as an automobile assembler at Chrysler Corporation, where he
had begun working during college and where "his wages as an assembler exceeded those of any job that his degree in industrial technology
would enable him to obtain."46 Then his life began to fall apart in
1990. 47 A second conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol
resulted in the loss of Roberson's driving license and his dismissal from
Chrysler in February. 48 In April Roberson divorced from his wife. 4 9

The divorce judgment ordered Roberson to pay $121.60 per week in
child support and awarded possession of the marital residence and automobile to his former wife. 50 Without steady employment, Roberson's 1990 income plummeted to only $6,000, leaving him unable to
pay his creditors.5 '
Roberson filed for Chapter Seven bankruptcy on September 28,
1990.52 At that time, Roberson had no income and an estimated $680

per month in expenses, including $40 a week to rent a one room apartment with no kitchen or toilet. In addition, the $34,395 in debts listed
in his bankruptcy petition overwhelmed his $18,357 in assets, $11,250
of which represents an illiquid interest in the house that his former
wife possessed. Hence, both parties agreed that his financial condition
at the time of the petition prevented Mr. Roberson from maintaining a
minimal standard of living and making payments on his student
53
loans.
43,

See Roberson, 999 F.2d at 1133.

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

See id.
See id.
Id. at 1133-34.
See In re Roberson, 999 F.2d at 1134.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 1137.
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After conflicting decisions on the discharge of Roberson's student
loans by the bankruptcy court and the district court, the Seventh Circuit adopted Brunner as the appropriate test and held that Roberson
had not established "undue hardship." 54 The court concluded that
Roberson's financial situation would only last temporarily rather than
over a large portion of the repayment period. 55
The Seventh Circuit first noted that Roberson's short-term outlook was unquestionably dismal: "[T]he Debtor was unemployed at
the time of trial with slight prospects for employment in the near future with his lack of transportation and [his wrist and back injuries]." 6
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the bankruptcy court
that these impediments "would not prohibit gainful employment in
the future," that "Mr. Roberson will be eligible for a new driver's license in 1993," and that "his medical condition does not appear 'insurmountable.'"' 5 7 Thus, without deciding whether Roberson's drunk
driving convictions precluded a finding of good faith, the court denied
Roberson discharge of his student loans for "undue hardship" because
he had not "indicated his road to recovery is obstructed by the type of
barrier that would lead us to believe he will lack the ability to repay for
several years." 58 Fortunately for Roberson, the Seventh Circuit agreed
with the bankruptcy court's decision to allow him a "two-year deferment to enable him to get back on his feet."5 9 Less fortunate for Roberson was how the Seventh Circuit could fail to conclude that "undue
hardship" had been established.
B.

The Johnson Test

The Brunnertest is a popular modification of a test set forth previously by the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
in Pennsylvania HigherEducation Assistance Agency v. Johnson (In reJohnson).6 0 Under the Johnson test, the court considers: (1) a mechanical
analysis of the debtor's past and probable future resources; 6' (2) the
debtor's good faith, including the debtor's best efforts to repay the
54.

See Roberson, 999 F.2d at 1137-38.

55.
56.

See id. at 1137.
Id.

57.

1&

58.

Id. at 1137-38.
Id-at 1137.

59.
60.
61.

5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 532 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1979).
See id. at 544.
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loan and minimize expenses; 62 and (3) a policy analysis of the debtor's
motives in filing, including whether the debtor derived financial benefits from the education received by virtue of the loans. 63 The student
loan is non-dischargeable if the court finds against the debtor on any
64
of the three factors.
Under the Johnson test, the debtor's financial circumstances are
rigorously scrutinized. 65 First, the mechanical analysis is really an inquiry into whether a debtor can support himself and his dependents at
a subsistence or poverty level while continuing to make monthly student loan payments at the same time. 66 Second, the good faith inquiry
empowers the court to rule that expenses for necessities are unnecessary where it believes the debtor could have avoided or diminished
67
expense through the exercise of "ordinary prudence."
A court's views of what constitutes "ordinary prudence" can be
shockingly harsh. 68 For example, the court might conclude that a
debtor's rent and utility expenses were excessive if the debtor had chosen to live alone rather than with a roommate. 69 The court might also
conclude that a debtor lacks good faith if he or she does not work at
the most economically productive job possible. 70 Therefore, a debtor
who is unable to find work in his or her field of study should seriously
consider finding work in another field in order to demonstrate good
faith. 71 Moreover, a debtor should try to avoid voluntarily working at a
job that pays less than he or she is capable of earning. 72 It is easy to see
that a debtor's personal choices necessarily become limited by the
73
ongoing requirement of good faith.
62. SeeJohnson, 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. at 544.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See Salvin, supra note 6, at 153-57.
66. See id. at 153-54.
67. See id. at 155.
68. See id. at 155-56. See also Wegrzyniak v. United States (In re Wegrzyniak), 241
B.R. 689 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1999) (holding that a debtor-teacher failed to satisfy the
second and third parts of the Brunner test because she had chosen, after her eighteen
year old son had begun using drugs and had attempted suicide, to spend her summers
raising her nine year old son rather than seeking additional summer employment).
69. See Johnson, 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CCR) at 541.
70. See id. at 541-42.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See Salvin, supra note 6, at 156.
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C.

The Bryant-Poverty Test

Some courts have declined to follow either the Johnson or Brunner
approaches. 74 In Bryant v. Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance
Agency (In re Bryant),75 the court expressed dissatisfaction with the "unbridled subjectivity" involved in the good faith analysis of undue hard76
ship cases.
Instead, the court settled for a poverty test under which the
debtor's student loans are presumed non-dischargeable if the debtor's
income exceeds federal poverty guidelines. 77 That presumption can
only be rebutted if the debtor can prove extraordinary circumstances
meriting discharge despite the debtor's lack of poverty. 78 Conversely,
a debtor's student loans are presumed dischargeable if the debtor's
income falls below federal poverty guidelines, unless the creditors can
prove extraordinary circumstances why discharge should be denied.7 9
Bryant has made the Federal Poverty Guidelines an important
guide in testing for undue hardship.8 0 Many courts now consider the
Federal Poverty Guidelines in undue hardship cases, while a few courts
have even adopted the guidelines as the sole determinant of undue
hardship. 8 1
D.

Miscellaneous Variations

Other courts have added levels of precision to particular factors of
the different tests. 82 Although this practice may clarify an ambiguity
within the test applied in a specific jurisdiction, it can also add to the
83
overall confusion.
For example, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that
under the Brunner test, a debtor's student loans may not be discharged
unless there is "certain" hopelessness, rather than merely temporary
84
hopelessness, in the analysis of the debtor's future income potential.
The court also added that the good faith inquiry requires denial of
74.
75.
76.

See Andresen, 232 B.R. at 138.
See 72 B.R. 913 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
See id. at 916-17.

77.
78.
79.

See id. at 916-19.
See id.
See id.

80.

See Salvin, supra note 6, at 162.

81.

See id.

82.

See Andresen, 232 B.R. at 138.

83.

See id.

84.

See Roberson, 999 F.2d at 1135.
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discharge where the debtor's inability to repay student loans is due to
negligence or irresponsibility in conducting his or her own financial
85
affairs.
Two courts have modified the undue hardship analysis more drastically.8 6 First, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has gone so far as to
redefine undue hardship as "unconscionable" hardship. 8 7 Second, the
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado has stated that it disagrees with the Brunner test "to the extent that it looks to the 'repayment period of the loan' to determine whether the debtor's undue
hardship situation is likely to persist."8 8 The court concluded that
§ 523(a) (8) "speaks to the 'debt' and not to the repayment period of
the loan itself," and that student loan debts should be discharged when
89
there is no hope for the debtor to repay in the future.
E. The Cheesman and Pena Tests
In some cases courts are simply unable to tell precisely which test
has been applied by another court. For example, in Andresen v. Nebraska Student Loan Program (In re Andresen), Inc.,9° the court expressed

difficulty in distinguishing between the Brunner test and the test
adopted by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Cheesman v. Tennessee
Student Assistance Corp (In re Cheesman). 91 But in United Student Aid

Funds,Inc. v. Pena (In re Pena), the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the
92
Ninth Circuit disagreed.
The Pena court seized upon certain wording from Brunner,apparently absent from Cheesman, as a way of adopting its own totality of the
circumstances approach. 93 Specifically, the Pena court focused on the
Sixth Circuit's apparent omission of the second prong of the Brunner
test, whether the debtor's state of financial affairs is likely to persist for
85. See Roberson, 999 F.2d at 1136.
86. See Andresen, 232 B.R. at 138.
87. See Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72
F.3d 298, 306 (3rd Cir. 1995) (quoting Matthews v. Pineo, 19 F.3d 121, 124 (3rd Cir.
1994)).
88. Jones v. Catholic Univ. of Am. (In reJones), 1997WL 52188, at *1 n. 2 (Bankr.
D. Col. 1997).
89. Id.
90. See Andresen, 232 B.R. 127.
91.
See id. at 138-39.
92. See 207 B.R. 919, 922 (BAP. 9th Cir. 1997).
93. See id.
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a significant portion of the repayment period.94 The court stated that
"rigid adherence.. .to a particular test robs the court of the discretion
envisioned by Congress in drafting § 523 (a) (8)."95
As desirable as a totality of the circumstances test may be, however, the Pena court's attempt to distinguish the Brunnertest from the
Cheesman test appears flawed.9 6 In Cheesman, the court explicitly
quoted the Brunner test in full and proceeded to analyze the debtor's
undue hardship claim under all three elements. 97 More accurately,
the Pena court rejected the Brunnertest's good-faith limitation because
it precludes a debtor from introducing evidence that the education
paid for by student loans was of little or no use or benefit to the
debtor. 98 Therefore, Pena's true holding is that "undue hardship" is
flexible enough that the value of a debtor's education can properly be
considered in determining the debtor's future ability to pay.9 9
F. The Totality of the Circumstances Test
Many courts apply a totality of the circumstances test to determine
undue hardship.10 0 For example, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of South Dakota has rejected the Brunnertest in lieu of a "case-bycase" and "fact-sensitive" approach that considers a debtor's good faith,
financial resources, and necessary expenses as well as any other circumstances. 1 0 ' The totality of the circumstances test is a more desirable approach than the others because it "affords a determination that
contextually considers both the debtor's situation and the policies underlying § 523 (a) (8)."102 The totality of the circumstances test better
"ensures an appropriate, equitable balance [between] concern for
cases involving extreme abuse and concern for the overall fresh start
policy."
94.

103

See id.

95. Id.
96. See Andresen, 232 B.R. at 138-39.
97. See 25 F.3d 356, 359-60 (6' Cir. 1994).
98. See Andresen, 232 B.R. at 139.
99. See id; see also Pena, 207 B.R. at 923.
100. See Andresen, 232 B.R at 139-40.
101. See Law v. Educ. Res. Inst. Inc. (In re Law, SSN: 504-90-2960), 159 B.R. 287,
292-93 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1993).
102. Id.
103. Id.
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The totality of the circumstances test has been adopted by the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.' 0 4 The Eighth Circuit's test for undue hardship considers "(1) the debtor's past, present, and reasonably
reliable future financial resources; (2) calculation of the debtor's and
his dependents' reasonable necessary living expenses, and (3) any
other relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the particular
bankruptcy case." 0 5 The Eighth Circuit approach is preferable to
Brunnerand the other tests because it is less restrictive than those tests,
10 6
yet it maintains the essential considerations found in the other tests.
Although a Brunner analysis of the debtor's future ability to repay student loans is not ignored under the totality of the circumstances approach, neither does that one factor became dispositive against a
finding of undue hardship where the debtor is currently in grave cir07
cumstances requiring an immediate fresh start.'
IV. THE

ELIMINATION OF THE SEVEN-YEAR DISCHARGE AND THE IRONY
OF EQUrrABLE RELIEF

Courts have often exercised their equitable powers to cushion the
harsh effects imposed by § 523(a) (8).108 At the same time, however,
courts have continued to abide by a narrow interpretation of "undue
hardship" even though that interpretation developed in the context of
the now repealed seven-year discharge. 10 9 As one court has stated:
The rigidity of some of those "tests" almost suggests that
the solution to human suffering lies in the application of
algebraic equations... [W] e cannot commit the court to a
policy of mechanical evaluation of comprehensive human
problems. "Undue hardship" is a concept so fraught with
subjective elements that we must consider the totality of
the circumstances to confirm its presence or absence....
Our approach is not intended to yield a general rule applicable to a broad class of cases, but remains as flexible
and adaptable as the concept of equity itself. We are able
to say only that the whole of a debtor's condition, in an
104. See Andresen, 232 B.R. at 139-40; see also Andrews v. S. Dakota Student Loan
Assistance Corp. (In re Andrews), 661 F.2d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 1981).
105. See Andresen, 232 B.R. at 139.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 130-31.
108. See Collins, supra note 20, at 749-51.
109. See Andresen, 232 B.R. at 130 n.7.
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undue hardship case, should be sufficient to strike a
chord of pity in the heart of equity. 110
Thus, many courts have found it necessary to revise loans, partially discharge loans, or defer payments by maintaining or extending the automatic stay."' By manipulating § 523(a) (8) courts can uphold the
policies behind non-dischargeability while balancing that interest with
the fresh start policy." 2 Some courts find the authority to grant partial
discharges and other equitable relief implicit in § 523 (a) (8),'1 3 while
others rely on the equitable powers of § 105(a). 114 Section 105(a) essentially allows a bankruptcy court to tailor an equitable solution
5
around the facts of a particular case."
Critics of partial discharge of student loans argue that Congress's
silence in § 523(a) (8) should foreclose that possibility. 116 If Congress
intended for courts to revise or partially discharge student loans, Congress could have expressly provided for those options in § 523 (a) (8) or
included broader language revealing such equitable solutions as a policy objective." 7 Critics have also argued that § 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code does not provide authority for partial discharge or
revision of student loans; rather, the equitable powers of bankruptcy
courts may only be exercised within the enumerations of the Code. 118
The jurisdictional split over whether a court may partially discharge a
debtor's student loan or whether courts are confined to an all-or-nothing discharge has grown over the past two decades." 9
110.

Moorman v. Kentucky Higher Educ. Assistance Auth. (In re Moorman), 44

B.R. 135, 137-38 (Bankr. W.D. K. 1984).
111.
See Andresen, 232 B.R. at 130; see also Collins, supra note 20, at 737 (arguing
that Congress should amend § 523(a) (8) explicitly to provide revision as an option for
the courts and the parties to student loan discharge proceedings). The automatic stay,
found at 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994), is a mechanism that stops most actions taken against
the debtor during the course of a bankruptcy case. See KAREN GRoss, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRuprcy SysTEM 291 (Yale University Press 1997).
112.
See Andresen, 232 B.R. at 130-31.
113. See id. at 131.
114. See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1994), which provides, "The court may issue any order,
process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this

tile. No provision of this title ... shall be construed to preclude the court from, sua
sponte, taking any action or making any determination necessary or appropriate.., to
prevent an abuse of process."
115. See Kapinos v. GraduateLoan Ctr. (In re Kapinos), 243 BR 271 (W.D. Va. 2000).
116. See Andresen, 232 B.R. at 131.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 129.
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The most compelling reason for allowing partial discharge or
other revision of student loans is fairness. 120 In borderline cases, partial discharge makes it possible for the court to discharge those portions of student loan debt that are causing the debtor's "undue
hardship" while requiring the debtor to continue repayment of the remaining student loan debt.' 2 ' Partial discharge promotes fairness by
affording some relief to the debtor, while ensuring that the government is not unjustly deprived by a complete discharge of student loans
122
that could be repaid in part without imposing "undue hardship."'
Since October 7, 1998, it appears that only one court has recognized the full importance of the repeal of the seven-year discharge as it
relates to "undue hardship."' 23 In Andresen, the debtor, Donna Mae
Andresen, obtained three student loans in three consecutive years
while attending nursing school.' 24 Andresen filed her Chapter Seven
bankruptcy petition in 1991.125 From time to time, Andresen had incurred extraordinary medical expenses as a result of her daughter's
medical condition.' 26 Andresen's regular expenses included caring
for her two children and paying off a second mortgage.12 7 During the
course of her bankruptcy case, Andresen sustained a severe back injury
that made it impossible for her to find work in her home state of Nebraska. 128 After a nationwide job search, Andresen finally found an
120. See Collins, supra note 20, at 753.
121. See id. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that § 105(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code grants the court authority to partially discharge student loans, to institute a repayment schedule modifying the repayment terms of the loan, to defer repayment, to allow the debtor to subsequently re-open the proceedings to argue for "undue
hardship" discharge, or to fashion any appropriate remedy. See Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v. Hornsby (In re Hornsby), 144 F.3d 433, 439-40 (6th Cir. 1998). The
Sixth Circuit stated that in a case "where undue hardship does not exist, but where facts
and circumstances require intervention in the financial burden on the debtor, an all-ornothing treatment thwarts the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act." Id. at 439. Although
the court's intentions were honorable, its reasoning leaves an important question unanswered: If the facts and circumstances of a particular case are so grave as to require the
court to exercise its equitable powers, why should the court be constrained from concluding that "undue hardship" has been established?
122. See Collins, supranote 20, at 753-54. But see GRoss, supra note 11, at 154-55
(arguing that the government's status as a priority creditor should be reconsidered,
given the government's better position to recapture bankruptcy losses than other creditors, such as employees).
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

See Andresen, 232 B.R. at 130 n. 7.
See id. at 129.
See id.
See id. at 141.
See id.
See i& at 129.
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her disability in Nevada, where she
employer willing to accommodate
129
moved to take that job.
After a trial on Andresen's student loans, the bankruptcy court
discharged two of her three loans, concluding that she could repay the
third loan without "undue hardship."1 30 On appeal, the Nebraska Student Loan Program argued that the bankruptcy court erred by finding
that two of Andresen's student loans would impose "undue hardship"
if they were not discharged, and that the bankruptcy court had no authority to grant a partial discharge.1 3 ' Without deciding whether a
partial discharge is authorized by § 523 (a) (8), the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit held that application of the "undue
hardship" test to each student loan separately was not only allowed, but
was required.' 3 2 Consequently, the bankruptcy court had not even ordered a partial discharge in the traditional sense. 133 Significantly, the
Andresen court observed:
That the original statute contemplated a point at which a
debtor could discharge student loans completely and
without a showing of undue hardship may explain the apparent all-or-nothing approach to the undue hardship
discharge exception. Congress simply wasn't contemplating any situation in which a loan would require revision
by a bankruptcy court because either a loan would be
fully dischargeable before the five (or seven) years on the
basis of undue hardship, or it would be fully dischargeable in any event upon expiration of the applicable number of years. Under the original statute, therefore, a
debtor would be unlikely to seek relief in bankruptcy
prior to the expiration of the applicable number of years
since repayment on a student loan became due, unless
34
the debtor's undue hardship made it imperative.'
The critical observation made by the court in Andresen is that throughout the cases where courts have granted equitable relief to student
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 137, 141. One significant reason underlying the Andresen decision
was the court's conclusion that the determination of "undue hardship" is a factual determination reversible only for clear error. See id. at 128. Other courts have concluded
that the determination of "undue hardship" is a question of law subject to de novo
review. See e.g., Cheesman, 25 F.3d at 359.
133. See Andresen, 232 B.R.at 141.
134. Id.
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loan debtors, those courts lacked any compelling reason to alter the
standard for "undue hardship." 135 First, courts did not even arrive at
the question of equitable relief until they had already determined that
the debtor did not qualify for the "undue hardship" exception.13 6 Second, courts did not view the issue as whether the standard for establishing "undue hardship" was too high; rather, the issue was whether the
policies behind non-dischargeability could be promoted while
giving
13 7
some deference to the fresh start policy at the same time.
Courts were satisfied that the tests for proving "undue hardship"
could not be too restrictive because that was just one of two ways for
debtors to have their loans discharged. 13 8 In any case where a debtor
could not prove "undue hardship" before the expiration of the five or
seven year period, the loan would be automatically discharged absent
that showing as soon as the applicable time period expired. 139
That logic breaks down now that the seven-year discharge exception has been repealed. 140 Without a seven-year automatic discharge
to protect debtors, it is now incumbent on the courts to reconsider
whether "undue hardship" can continue to be interpreted as restric141
tively as in the past.
The National Bankruptcy Review Commission l4 2 has gone even
further by recommending the total repeal of § 523(a) (8).143 In its report the commission first traced the history of § 523, noting that originally there was only a short list of exceptions to discharge for certain
kinds of wrongdoing.'4 These types of wrongdoing included fraud,
defalcation, and intentional torts. 145 Over time, the list of exceptions
135. See Andersen, 232 B.R. at 141.
136. See Collins, supra note 20, at 753.
137. See Andresen, 232 B.R. at 130-31.
138. See id. at 130 n. 7.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. The National Bankruptcy Review Commission is an independent commission
established pursuant to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994. It was created to investigate and study issues relating to the Bankruptcy Code, to solicit divergent views concerning the operation of the bankruptcy system, to evaluate proposals with respect to
bankruptcy issues, and to prepare a report that was submitted to the President, Congress, and the ChiefJustice on October 27, 1997. See National Bankruptcy Review Commission at, http://www.nbrc.gov(last modified Nov. 26, 1997). The Commission ceased
to exist on November 19, 1997. See id.
143. See NATIONAL BANKRuircY REviEw COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, BANKRu-rc.
THE NEXT TWEN rvYEARS (1997), reprinted in [Vol. G] COLLIER ON BAN UPTCW 44-219229 (15th ed. revised 1999).
144. See id. at 44-193.
145. See id.
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has grown to 46nearly twenty, mostly as a result of special interest
amendments.1

The commission then suggested a number of specific reasons why
§ 523 (a) (8) should be repealed. First, the commission found it unfair
that a debtor overloaded with consumer debts incurred to by "a car, a
vacation, or a pizza" can resort to bankruptcy but a debtor who borrows to pay for tuition and books cannot. 47 Thus, the repeal of
§ 523 (a) (8) would make the treatment of most student loans similar to
the treatment of all other unsecured debts."48 Repeal of § 523(a) (8)
would also be consistent with federal policy to encourage educational
endeavors. 149 Additionally, Chapter Thirteen debtors who had made
diligent efforts to repay their loans would no longer be penalized after
the completion of a bankruptcy plan with thousands of dollars of compound interest.' 50 Finally, litigation over "undue hardship" would finally be eliminated, and discharge of student loans would no longer be
51
denied to those who need it most.'
V.

CONCLUSION

The existing tests for "undue hardship" under § 523(a) (8) of the
Bankruptcy Code were developed in the context of an automatic discharge for seven-year old student loans that could not be repaid. Now
that "undue hardship" is the only way for debtors to seek discharge of
student loans, courts should reassess and lower that standard. Although it may have sufficed in the past for courts to use their equitable
powers to lessen the impact of § 523 (a) (8), the repeal of the seven-year
discharge means that debtors need to have a realistic chance of proving "undue hardship." Otherwise, they will have no way out.
Scott Pashman
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See id. at 44-220.
See id. at 44-229.
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